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DETERMINANTS OF THE CHANGING FUNDING BURDEN OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 1
MATTHEW VAN DEN BERG
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT KEARNEY
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the political economy of public higher education funding in the United States
and offers a unique conceptual and empirical approach to describe the determinants of funding
sources. By evaluating the tuition proportion of revenue, this analysis estimates the determinants
of the relative distribution of the funding burden between public and private sources. The empirical
results show inelastic substitution between government appropriations and tuition revenue,
significant demand effects on tuition revenue, and that institutional differences contribute to
varying dependence on tuition as a source of revenue. The estimated determinants identify several
areas where state and university policies may directly affect the relative burden of higher education
costs.
Keywords: Education economics, education finance
INTRODUCTION
Public subsidization of higher education costs reached its peak in the years following
World War II. However, in the second half of the twentieth century, the revenues of public
universities have become more dependent upon tuition and fees paid by students. The trend toward
an increasing reliance on tuition as a source of revenue for public universities accelerated at the
beginning of the twenty-first century and shows few signs of slowing. Most research on this topic
has characterized the increased reliance on tuition as a substitution for exogenously determined
public funding. This approach neglects the complexity of public higher education funding. Of
course, budget constraints limit government allocations to higher education. However, budget
constraints are not exogenously determined because they are the result of political priorities and
public policy goals. Furthermore, tuition revenue is subject to the pricing strategies employed by
universities. This paper describes the shared cost burden of higher education as a function of
institutional factors 2 affecting the prioritization of higher education appropriations and the
willingness and ability of universities to generate tuition revenue by capturing student demand.
INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION AND FUNDING SOURCES
There has been a clear trend of decreased state funding and increased tuition even though
some of the effects have been partially offset by federal funding and increases in direct grant-aid
1
2
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Discussion of institutions and institutional factors with respect to higher education can cause some confusion due
to the common practice of referring to the universities and schools themselves as institutions. Within economic
theory, the term institution refers to formal and informal rules guiding social and economic interactions. Although
there is no universally agreed upon definition, Douglass North provided a popular description of institutions as
“humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction” (North 1991, 97). In this
paper, the term institution refers to the definition cited above and is not used as a synonym for a college or university.
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to individual students (National Center for Education Statistics 2019a). However, this does not
necessarily imply decreased state funding is an exogenous determinant of the rising tuition burden.
A more holistic approach, which considers the institutions that govern how higher education is
funded and rationed, will help clarify the underlying relationships between funding sources. Like
any other scarce good, higher education must be rationed, and price rationing has emerged as a
significant factor in its allocation. Price rationing is by no means the only method of determining
who attends college. For example, student merit contributes to the rationing of education and can
be recognized as academic skill, athletic ability, and other desirable characteristics. Universities,
students, and legislators recognize that any form of excludability can create a system of allocation
that produces benefits to certain students while potentially limiting others (Rosovsky 1990; Duffy
and Goldberg 1998; Winston 1999; Alon and Tienda 2007).
Whether it is price rationing, academic merit, athletic prowess, or social capital, the
qualifications used to determine who receives a college education will affect social beliefs about
the purposes and goals of higher education. For example, the past practice of allowing family
connections and social status to serve as admission qualifications for Ivy League schools
contributes to the lingering belief that these schools serve as social grooming for the elite (Mullen
2009). In recent times, the expansion of college sports and athletic scholarships may contribute to
the social view that universities have become overly engaged in the sports entertainment business.
Although higher education continues to be rationed in many ways, this analysis will focus on price
rationing occurring through rising tuition rates.
The existing literature has extensively documented the shifting funding burden from public
sources to individual tuition payments. However, the empirical literature on public higher
education is often biased by assumptions of exogeneity between government appropriations and
tuition revenue. The complex relationships between formal and informal institutions governing
higher education funding create endogeneity between the various funding sources. Therefore, it
is inaccurate to model one funding source as an exogenous determinate of the other.
Rather than modelling tuition as a substitute for government funding, this paper attempts
to identify specific institutional variables that can be linked with observable changes in the portion
of university revenue attributable to tuition revenue. Although they do not offer a specific model
or methodology, John W. Meyer, et al. (2007) encourage studying the relationships between higher
education and the wider institutional environment in ways that challenge the typical causality
assumptions of most research. Figure 1 presents an evolutionary model of the social process of
higher education allocation illustrating the interaction of beliefs, price-rationing policies, and
commodity characteristics of public higher education.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Institutional Change in Higher Education Funding

The institutional environment of higher education funding is complex, but we can identify
some important elements. The influence of the belief in a personal responsibility for higher
education costs grew in the 1970s and has only become stronger in the new millennium (Best
1988; Breneman 1997; Levine 1997; Schulman 2001; Loss 2012). This belief is rooted in the idea
that because higher education provides private financial benefits, it should be a fee-based service
paid for by students. Belief in a privatized funding strategy leads to policies that shift the funding
burden away from public sources to individualized funding such as tuition payments and direct
student aid
Along with increasing tuition levels, there has been an increase in the dollar amount of
student aid available. The use of publicly funded grant money to finance education reduces the
financial burden on students. However, the act of individuals choosing to spend personalized grant
money still strengthens the private relationship between students and higher education even if the
money spent was given to them (Barber 1992; Singell and Stone 2007; Loss 2012). The literature
examining the consequences of the increasing use of student loans also supports the theory of a
closer personal financial relationship between students and schools (Ozdagli and Trachter 2011;
Avery and Turner 2012; Mettler 2014).
Individualized funding and a higher private funding burden likely contribute to an
increased sense of private ownership over the returns to higher education. This belief creates
endogeneity of government funding and tuition. Students and families who take on a large
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financial burden to fund their education will likely feel they personally purchased the opportunity
to earn high wages. The strength of this belief is evident in the common characterization of
education as an investment.
The increased reliance on tuition revenue as a funding source compels both students and
universities to recognize the exchange value of education. Universities must consider pricing
strategies and student demand in order to sell their services and generate the necessary revenue to
remain operational. The monetary exchange of tuition for education accentuates pecuniary
elements of higher education. While entertainment, social prestige, or the joys of learning also
contribute to students’ demand for higher education, the financial incentives appear to be the
primary motivator (Schofer and Meyer 2005; Perna 2008; Ozdagli and Trachter 2011; Avery and
Turner 2012). The financial benefits are a significant contributor to student demand, and the
pecuniary assessment of tuition and monetary benefits contributes to increased social relevance of
the exchange value of higher education.
The commodified allocation of higher education reinforces the social and cultural belief
that individuals should be responsible for their own education costs, thereby reinforcing the cycle.
The literature describes an increasing acceptance of higher tuition and increased reliance on
student loans, as well as an unwillingness to increase government aid or appropriations to limit the
reliance on tuition revenue (Jongbloed 2003; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; M. J. Rizzo 2006; Perna
2008; Archibald and Feldman 2011). Students and states are accepting and adapting to the
changing institutional environment of higher education allocation.
Institutional changes governing the distribution of higher education funding are selfreinforcing because those students who purchased their education are likely to have a strengthened
sense of private ownership over their purchase. For example, a student who personally paid for
college may feel they paid a fair price and deserves the higher wages resulting from their degree.
After graduation, this sense of private ownership may increase their opposition to having their
higher wages taxed in order to publicly subsidize other students’ college costs. This hypothesized
response is supported by research showing survey respondents who completed a college degree
were more likely than respondents without a college degree to say that federal spending on
financial aid for college students should be decreased (American National Election Studies 2012).
In a survey by the Pew Research Center (2011), those with any level of post-secondary education
were more likely than those with only a high school diploma or less to say, “Students or their
families should pay the largest share of a student’s college expenses.” The survey also showed
that the source of college students’ funding may affect their opinions. Sixty percent of those who
paid most of their college expenses using personal or family funds and loans felt students and their
families should bear most of the funding burden. On the other hand, only forty-one percent of
those who relied on scholarships felt that way (Pew Research Center 2011).
The process illustrated in Figure 1 and described above is cyclical and allows for continued
institutional evolution and reinforcement of policies and beliefs. This cyclical model differs from
the typical linear approach which assumes tax revenue determines government funding for higher
education and that tuition revenue is then used to fill in the remaining budget gap. Assuming
exogenous government revenue ignores the importance of institutions affecting revenue and
expenditures and their effects on funding for higher education. The assumption of exogenous
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appropriations as a determinant of tuition disregards the endogeneity of tax revenue because states
that desire lower tuition rates are likely to raise tax revenue to subsidize student costs.
EMPIRICAL METHODS
As described above, the institutional structure that leads to higher education funding
policies is complex. The empirical specification in this analysis reduces the bias created by the
simultaneity of the observed public and private revenue components in two ways. First, the
following empirical model will analyze the determinants of the tuition revenue as a proportion of
government funding. Also, this analysis does not assume the desire to subsidize education is
constant over time or across institutional environments; therefore it includes variables that likely
correlate with social beliefs concerning the appropriate level of government funding. In the last
twenty years, rising student demand, university operating strategies, the shift toward federal
student assistance, changing governing board structure, shifting state budget priorities, and
increased private competition have exerted influence on higher education funding. This empirical
analysis estimates the effects of these institutional factors and other determinants on the
proportional tuition funding burden born by students. Therefore, the empirical results also relate
to the conceptual model in Figure 1 describing how the institutional environment can contribute
to the shift of the funding burden from publically funded sources to individualized student tuition
payments.
Previous Empirical Studies
While no previous study of structural changes in higher education used a similar conceptual
framework or proportional tuition measurement, there have been several previous studies which
have also explored the balance between state appropriations and tuition revenues. Due to the vast
amount of published work on the subject, a full review of the literature would be unnecessarily
cumbersome. The literature discussed below has similarities or results that relate directly to the
empirical work of this paper.
Koshal and Koshal (2000) used a state level model to simultaneously estimate the tuition
and state appropriation levels for universities. Their study only uses data from 2000, does not
account for federal funding, and aggregates results to the state level, but their three-stage least
squares model offers an attempt to consider the simultaneous effects of changing funding sources.
Koshal and Koshal challenged previous work by Hearn, Griswold, and Marine (1996) that
supported the hypothesis that tuition increases were driven by regional factors such as income and
the prevalence of private higher education competition. Koshal and Koshal’s findings indicate
that the level of state appropriation was also an important factor in determining the tuition levels
even when including dummy variables to capture differences between regions. However, their
simultaneous estimates for tuition and state appropriations found inelastic substitution effects
between the two revenue sources. Their finding of inelastic substitution effects suggests that
modeling tuition as a direct substitute for government funds may not be appropriate. In addition,
the significance of regional dummy variables found by Hearn, Griswold and Marine (1996) and
Koshal and Koshal (2000) suggest more detailed model specifications could identify the relevant
differences captured by fixed effects. The reliance on state or regional fixed effects is also
common in literature focused on modeling state higher education expenditures (Kane, Orszag, and
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Gunter 2003; Okunade 2004; Ronca and Weerts 2012).
Lowry (2001a, 2001b) concluded that universities with more administrative autonomy tend
to generate more revenue from tuition, indicating that political forces and state legislatures do have
some influence over the tuition rates charged at individual universities. This conclusion along
with studies showing price inelastic demand (Heller 1999; Shin and Milton 2005; Hemelt and
Marcotte 2011) indicate that universities’ ability to exploit their full revenue generating potential
is held in check by institutional factors. In other words, state-level oversight and less
administrative autonomy may reduce the tuition revenue collected by public universities.
Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004) simultaneously estimated changes in tuition for both in-state
and out-of-state students, the level of state grant-aid, and the share of students who pay nonresident tuition. Their study shows how demand-side pressure allowed some universities to
capture higher tuition revenues. Like Koshal and Koshal (2000), Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004)
estimated very inelastic substitution between state and federal funding and tuition revenue. The
inelastic substitution between government funding and tuition funding was corroborated in later
work by Kim and Ko (2015) and Webber (2017). These results suggest that it is not correct to
assume tuition is a direct substitute for government funding, and that the other factors explored in
this research may be more important determinants of tuition.
Serna (2015) expanded the analysis of tuition rates by exploring institutional factors that
may be correlated with changes to government funding such as tax and expenditure limitation rules
and political ideology. Serna (2018) also explored regional fixed effects as a method for capturing
institutional differences that may affect tuition rates. These studies support the conceptual model
proposed in Figure 1, which describes a process where underlying social priorities may
significantly affect tuition rates at public universities. However, the empirical approach of both
Serna’s models uses state government appropriations for universities as an exogenous determinant
of tuition.
Model Specification
Prior research treating state appropriations as an exogenous explanatory variable for tuition
suffer from bias in the estimates because of the endogeneity between those two sources of revenue.
As described above, this endogeneity is created by the simultaneous effects on both sources of
revenue from the formal and informal institutions that guide higher education funding policies.
Therefore, models that do not include independent variables to capture these institutional
differences are biased by omitted variables. Alternatively, models that include state appropriations
along with independent variables capturing institutional differences are biased by multicollinearity
between independent variables. Previous studies provide evidence that tuition and government
funding are not dollar-for-dollar substitutes, which also supports the conceptual hypothesis that
tuition and government funding levels are not merely the result of budget substitutions. In addition
to the endogeneity, there is a lack of clear directional causality between tuition and state funding.
Prior studies have shown the process of setting tuition and determining state appropriations is
complicated, political, conducted with asymmetrical information, and requires sequential
negotiations (Serna 2018). Therefore, it is theoretically incorrect to include either of the revenue
sources as an exogenous determinant of the other.
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The empirical model used here attempts to avoid the biases caused by the endogeneity of
tuition and government appropriations by using a specification that includes both revenue sources
in the dependent variable. By using tuition revenue measured as a proportion of government
revenue as the dependent variable, changes to state funding will also be reflected in the dependent
variable because state funding is included in the base value of the tuition proportion. This
specification allows for testing of independent variables that may affect tuition or state funding or
both. Using the proportional measurement also reduces biases due to underlying cost trends and
difficulties in normalizing dollar figures across different years and states. This specification will
help highlight the limitations of estimating only one revenue source. To compare the findings of
this research to previous studies, the results will also contain estimations of the per student dollar
amounts of state appropriations and tuition revenues.
Like most other studies, this model recognizes that unforeseen or poorly anticipated
economic conditions can cause shortfalls in public funding and will likely affect the balance
between funding sources. In addition, the composition of revenue will be affected by the
prioritization of higher education funding and the level of student demand. For each observed
university and year, tuition revenue as a proportion of government revenue is estimated using a
generalized least squares panel regression with variables intended to capture state budget
constraints, political institutions, and student demand, as well as fixed effects for states and years.
The state fixed effects reduce omitted variable bias by capturing variations between states
unaccounted for by the independent variables. This specification is more appropriate than an
individual university fixed effect model because it allows for estimation of the effects of timeinvariant university characteristics. The time fixed effects reduce omitted variable bias by
correcting for underlying annual trends that are difficult to capture with the available data. In
addition, the standard errors are clustered by schools to account for heteroscedasticity. The
following equation shows the general conceptual approach of the empirical model, and the data
section below includes detailed descriptions of the specific variables.
proportional tuition revenue = β0 + β1 (state budget) + β2 (political institutions)
+ β3 (student demand) + (State FE) + (Year FE) + ϵ
Where: proportional tuition revenue =

𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

The proportional tuition revenue is estimated using determinants that influence the levels
of both tuition revenue and government funding. The intent of this analysis is not to examine the
absolute costs of higher education, but rather to evaluate how the costs are shared between
privately funded tuition and public subsidization. In the dependent variable, privately paid tuition
is in the numerator while taxpayer funded public revenue sources are in the denominator.
Therefore, the relative size of the private and public revenue sources will determine the rise and
fall of the tuition proportion. Determinants of state funding affect the tuition proportion by altering
the public revenue used as the base value of the tuition proportion. Student demand and the
willingness and ability of universities to capture that demand affect the tuition proportion primarily
through tuition revenue. Some variables also influence the proportional tuition by affecting both
tuition rates and the amount of government appropriations allocated to universities. The results
also include separate estimations of per student dollar amounts of state appropriations and tuition
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revenue to provide some insight into how each independent variable is affecting both the
numerator and denominator used to determine the proportional tuition.
The panel regression includes determinants of the proportional tuition associated with the
scarcity of government funds, political institutions, students’ willingness to pay, university
characteristics, and other differences between states. If the variation in the proportional tuition
revenue is determined primarily by state budget limitations, then institutional factors unrelated to
economic conditions should play only a small role in determining how higher education is funded.
If tuition revenue is determined primarily by the scarcity of available public funds, then exogenous
economic and budget conditions should be the only significant determinants. However, both
political and budgetary pressures can contribute to rising tuition (Johnstone 2004). States may
prioritize funding to schools based on specific university characteristics. Also, the prioritization
of subsidizing higher education costs may vary due to changing political beliefs over time.
Stronger beliefs in the personal responsibility for higher education costs should produce a shift in
funding priorities, and will lead to increased reliance on tuition as a revenue source. University
characteristics and variations across the institutional environments of the states that increase the
ability of universities to capture students’ willingness to pay should positively correlate with higher
proportional tuition. Also, demographic characteristics that are associated with higher or lower
preferences for higher education will also likely be correlated with tuition revenue.
DATA
This study focuses on public universities in the United States offering degrees at the
baccalaureate level and above. The data set comprises a panel of 479 public universities observed
annually over the years 2001 to 2015, and yields 7103 observations across the multiple variables
and years of interest. Although it would be ideal to include data from earlier years, data collection
methods and changing variable definitions render data collected before and after 2000
incomparable for the objectives of this research. Some schools do not report data for all years, but
the bias due to an unbalanced panel is likely less consequential than the bias created by dropping
the schools with incomplete data because the missing data is not randomly distributed. For
example, only the top-tier research schools, University of Kansas and Kansas State University,
reported data for all years while the smaller Kansas campuses did not. Similarly for New York
universities, dropping schools with missing observations would have excluded all schools within
the SUNY system while retaining nearly all of the CUNY schools.
As described above, the main dependent variable of interest in this model is tuition revenue
measured as a proportion of government allocations. Figure 2 shows the percentage of total
revenue from tuition along with the percentage attributable to state grants and appropriations, and
federal grants and appropriations.
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Figure 2: Average Percentage of University Revenue by Source. Source: National Center for
Education Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics 2019b).

Figure 2 shows the percentages of the three main sources of revenue, but excludes from
total revenue investment income, hospital revenue, sales from auxiliary enterprises, and other
undefined and volatile revenue sources. After subtracting those unstable and extraneous sources
of revenue, tuition, state, and federal sources of revenue consistently compose nearly ninety
percent of remaining revenues for the universities in the sample. The remaining ten percent of
revenue consists of local grants and appropriations, private gifts, and other revenue generating
operations of the university.
In this dataset, tuition revenue measures only tuition and fees paid by students or their
benefactors. Tuition revenue does not include any revenue billed as tuition but paid through
federal, state, or university grants and scholarships. Therefore, the proportional tuition measures
the extent to which universities have shifting to selling their goods and services directly to students
rather than relying on taxpayer funded government allocations and other university funds.
The independent variables are comprised of both university specific and state-wide
observations and can be organized into four categories. The panel regression specification allows
the model to estimate the effects of these variables as they vary between states, universities, and
years. To help reduce the error correlation due to the potential for endogeneity between funding
sources and certain right-hand-side variables, one-year lagged terms are used to eliminate the
possibility of a reversed direction of causality in the estimated relationships. The descriptive
statistics of the variables are shown in Table 1 and descriptions of each variable follow.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Variables. Data Sources: National Center for
Education Statistics (2019a, 2019b), National Conference of State Legislatures (2019), U.S.
Census Bureau (2011, 2017, 2018), and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018).
Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Dep. Var: State appropriations per student (1000s 2016$s)

6.331

3.567

0.260

32.453

Dep. Var: Tuition revenue per student (1000s 2016$s)

4.909

2.778

0.304

22.488

Dep. Var: Tuition as a % of government funding

65.555

49.835

1.463

755.535

State unemployment rate L

6.152

2.029

2.3

13.7

Per capita K-12 state spending (1000s 2016$s)

1.845

0.399

1.247

3.645

Poverty rate L

13.259

3.219

4.5

23.1

Public post-secondary students as % of state population L

4.577

0.851

2.762

7.306

Frequency

Percent

0 = Republican or split

4,282

60.28

1 = Democratic control

2,821

39.72

0 = does not have an independent board

5,137

72.32

1 = has an independent board

1,966

27.68

6,608

93.03

495

6.97

0 = baccalaureate colleges, diverse fields

675

9.5

1 = baccalaureate colleges, arts, and sciences

361

5.08

2 = master's colleges and universities, small programs

458

6.45

3 = master's colleges and universities, medium programs

840

11.83

4 = master's colleges and universities, large programs

2,368

33.34

5 = doctoral / research universities

426

6.00

6 = research universities, high research activity

1,054

14.84

7 = research universities, very high research activity

921

12.97

State budget constraint variables

Political institution variables
Party control of state legislature

Independent board of governors

Number of boards of governors

6.257

5.082

1

18

3.004

3.190

0

32.815

Student demand variables
Federal funding per student (1000s 2016 $s)
Open admissions
0 = some restrictions or competitive admissions
1 = open enrollment
Percentage of out-of-state students L

15.319

14.174

0

94

Carnegie Rank of the University:

Public university students as % of all university students L

66.373

14.790

22.124

100

Youth percent of population

27.098

1.900

21.806

35.875

White, non-Hispanic percent of the youth population

60.569

16.783

13.528

94.428

15.858

12.731

0.627

81.789

Other control variables
Total student enrollment (1000s) L
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Median state income (1000s 2016 $s) L

55.832

8.352

33.310

81.023

7,103 observations from 479 colleges over 15 years (2001-2015), unbalanced panel
L indicates variable is lagged one year

State funding for higher education is a large component of state budgets but is not immune
to competition from other state funding priorities. The U3 annual state unemployment rate (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018) provides a measure of the economic conditions in each state and
year. Economic downturns and higher unemployment may reduce tax receipts, increase spending
on automatic stabilizer stimulus programs, and lead legislators to prioritize other budget items,
thereby reducing funding to public universities. In addition, universities may raise tuition rates in
order to substitute for the falling state appropriations.
State appropriations for primary and secondary schools are also a competing budget item
for higher education funding. Higher allocations to public K-12 education may leave less money
available for public higher education, and therefore could be positively correlated with
proportional tuition revenue. However, the same social priorities that lead certain states to provide
higher than average K-12 funding may also lead to higher state allocations to post-secondary
education. Therefore, it is possible that state spending on K-12 education could either be a
substitute or a compliment to higher education funding. In order to characterize K-12 spending as
a general funding burden for state governments, and to account for states and years with differing
student and non-student populations, the analysis will use K-12 spending per capita rather than per
pupil. This ratio is calculated using data from the National Center for Education Statistics (2019a)
and the U.S. Census Bureau (2011, 2017).
The poverty rate, collected from the U.S. Census Bureau (2018), provides an indicator of
the structural and cyclical spending used to alleviate the hardships of poverty. State portions of
Medicaid and SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) funding, along with other
spending aimed at assisting the poor, may compete with higher education funding. If state funding
for higher education is crowded out by other funding obligations, then higher poverty rates will
likely positively correlate with the tuition share of revenues.
The percentage of the population attending public post-secondary schools, calculated with
data from IPEDS (National Center for Education Statistics 2019b) and the U.S. Census Bureau
(2011, 2017), is intended to capture the ability of states to subsidize students’ college expenses. If
higher education subsidies are simply determined by a scarcity of funds, then more students
attending college will likely increase the proportion of university revenues generated through
tuition. On the other hand, state government funding may follow the priorities of the people in the
state. Proportionally larger student populations may correlate with prioritizing higher education
funding.
The next three variables are intended to capture the political and social prioritization of
subsidizing higher education costs. The policy platforms of the two major political parties tend to
place a different priority on education funding. Therefore, a correlation between proportional
tuition share and political majorities would indicate that funding priorities vary across states and
years and contribute to the distribution of the funding burden. Compiled using data from the
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National Conference of State Legislatures (2019), a categorical variable describes the majority
control in the two houses of state government, where 0 indicates Republicans control both houses,
1 indicates each party has a majority in one house, and a 2 indicates Democratic control of both
houses. One notable exception is the non-partisan, unicameral structure of Nebraska’s legislature.
The observations from the state of Nebraska were given values of 0 for all years due to the statewide dominance of the Republican Party during the observed time period.
Some states have large systems of public universities with many campuses represented by
a common board of governors. When universities concentrate their bargaining power into fewer
boards of governors, they may be more successful when lobbying for government funds.
Similarly, universities with their own separate board of governors may have limited lobbying and
bargaining power when competing for government funds against other campuses. In addition to
the total number of governing boards in the state, the regression includes an indicator variable
identifying universities that have an independent board representing only that particular university.
The data for these governing board variables is from the National Center for Education Statistics
(2019b).
The remaining variables capture a range of factors relating to student demand, although
some of these variables may also simultaneously influence the state’s prioritization of providing
funds. On average, the federal government supplies the third largest percentage of universities’
revenues. The federal revenue variable, from the National Center for Education Statistics (2019b),
is measured as a per student average and is adjusted to 2016 dollars. Most of this revenue is
received by universities in the form of student grant-aid although some of the federal money is
also allocated to research. Unlike state funding for higher education, federal funding can be
assumed to be an exogenous determinant due to both how federal funding is received by
universities and also by the federal legislative process used to set federal appropriations and grants.
As noted above, tuition payments made by students using grant-aid is not included in the measured
tuition revenue. If all other sources of revenue are constant, an increase in federal revenue should
decrease the percentage of revenue received through tuition payments. However, it is also likely
that federal funding to universities may affect state funding levels.
The selectivity of admissions, from the National Center for Education Statistics (2019b),
may correlate with elements of both student demand and government funding priorities. Schools
with minimal prerequisites and admission criteria are described as having open admissions. These
schools are often pressured by state officials and legislators into adopting these admissions
practices as part of a state effort to increase the accessibility of higher education and can be paired
with higher state subsidization and lower tuition. In contrast to open admission universities,
students may have higher demand for selective schools and those schools may be able to capture
students’ willingness to pay.
The percentage of out-of-state students, collected from IPEDS (National Center for
Education Statistics 2019b), is included to adjust for the higher tuition rates paid by those students.
The percentage of out-of-state students also likely correlates with the level of student demand for
attending that particular university. In addition, universities with larger percentages of out-of-state
students may be viewed by state legislators as less deserving of state funding.
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The National Center for Education Statistics (2019b) also provides data on the Carnegie
ranking of each school, defined as a discrete ordinal variable with values 0-7, where 0 is a nonspecialized baccalaureate college and 7 is a doctoral degree awarding, top-tier research university.
While the Carnegie rankings are determined by many factors, higher rankings are mostly
attributable to the level of research activity on the campus. While this variable is somewhat
correlated with other university characteristics, its inclusion is necessary to estimate any potential
revenue effects due to varying levels of research. In addition, the ranking of a school may also
contribute to student demand for that particular school.
State level data from the National Center for Education Statistics (2019b) is used to
calculate the percentage of public university students among all university students. This variable
shows the market share of public universities, and therefore also provides a measure of the relative
market share of and competition from private higher education providers within the state.
The youth percent of population and the white, non-Hispanic percent of the youth
population are calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011, 2017). The youth
population is defined as the percentage of the population under the age of twenty. These variables
are included to capture the relative differences in demographic characteristics across states as well
as changing demographics within states over the observed years.
The model also includes two additional control variables that aid the general accuracy of
the model and reduce omitted variable bias. Total student enrollment, from the National Center
for Education Statistics (2019b), is included to account for size differences between schools and
the potential correlations with student demand and differences in state funding priorities. A
squared enrollment term is also added to account for a non-linear enrollment effect likely to occur
with large campuses. Lagged annual median state income, from U.S. Census Bureau (2018), is
adjusted to 2016 dollars and may partly capture the willingness and ability of students and families
to pay for college costs. Household income will likely capture other demand effects as well, such
as a greater preference of children from wealthier households to attend college. States with higher
or lower income may also prioritize higher education subsidies differently. Income also serves as
a general economic indicator and may help account for fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions.
In addition, a squared income term is added to allow the model to identify the likelihood of a nonlinear relationship.
RESULTS
The results of the panel least squares regressions are presented in Table 2 and are consistent with
expectations and the conceptual model. Table 2 includes a preliminary regression estimating per
student revenue without attempting to capture the effects of variables related to differing political
institutions, funding prioritization, or student demand. These effects are therefore likely falling
into the estimated state and year fixed effects where they cannot be identified and interpreted.
Comparing the results of the reduced regression to the full model shows Comparing the results of
the reduced regression to the full model identifies the differences in institutional environment as
well as the varying levels of student demand as influential and their addition to the model helps
explain the mix of public and private revenue sources of higher education funding. As seen in the
R-squared estimates, the inclusion of political institutions and student demand variables also
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contributes to the overall fit of the model. A Wald Chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis that
all of the estimated coefficients in the political institutions category are zero. Similarly, the null
hypothesis that all of the estimated coefficients within the student demand category are zero is also
rejected. These statistical tests provide empirical evidence that variables related to the
prioritization of state subsidies and student demand offer an improvement to the model of higher
education funding.
The table also displays the estimated effects on per student dollar amounts of tuition
revenue and per student state funding to show how the determinants affect components of both the
numerator and denominator used to calculate the tuition proportion. The fourth regression shown
in the table is the estimated effects of the dependent variables on tuition measured as a percent of
government revenue. Comparing the results from the three fully specified regressions highlights
the limitations of only estimating the effects on one source of university revenue and the benefit
of estimating the proportional tuition revenue. In addition, the estimated effects of the dependent
variables on the dollar amounts of state appropriations and tuition revenue support the prior
research indicating inelastic substitution between these revenue sources, and offer additional
details to explain those prior findings. This research shows several instances where state
appropriations and tuition do not respond inversely to changes in an independent variable. This
supports the hypothesis that state appropriations and tuition should not be modelled merely as
budget substitutes and that a more complex model is necessary to understand higher education
funding levels.
Table 2: GLS Panel Regression Estimates
Dependent variables
(standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by school)
State
appropriation
s per student
($1000s)

State
appropriation
s per student
($1000s)

Tuition
revenue
per student
($1000s)

Tuition as a %
of government
funding

Unemployment rate L

-0.090 **
(0.035)

-0.084 ***
(0.032)

0.165 ***
(0.025)

0.203
(0.557)

Per capita K-12 state spending ($1000s) L

2.901 ***
(0.371)

3.194 ***
(0.382)

-0.951 ***
(0.260)

-36.385 ***
(5.223)

Poverty rate L

-0.039 ***
(0.012)

-0.036 ***
(0.012)

-0.002
(0.013)

0.161
(0.214)

Public post-secondary students / population L

0.734 ***
(0.182)

0.720 ***
(0.174)

-0.858 ***
(0.182)

-14.940 ***
(3.250)

Democratic Party control of state legislature

-0.014
(0.076)

0.023
(0.052)

2.204 *
(1.226)

Independent board of governors

0.143
(0.368)

0.236
(0.325)

-0.933
(5.148)

Number of boards of governors

-0.427 ***

0.053

2.710 *

Independent variables

State budget constraint variables

Political institution variables
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(0.106)

(0.102)

(1.514)

Federal funding per student ($1000s)

0.408 ***
(0.049)

0.163 ***
(0.045)

-3.589 ***
(0.806)

Open admissions

-0.080
(0.139)

-0.228 **
(0.115)

-1.516
(2.169)

Percent out of state students L

-0.002
(0.005)

0.028 ***
(0.004)

0.284 ***
(0.076)

Carnegie rank

0.291 ***
(0.074)

0.148 **
(0.060)

-0.390
(1.064)

Public university students / all university students L

0.022 ***
(0.006)

-0.021 **
(0.010)

-0.257 **
(0.128)

Youth percent of population

0.255 **
(0.107)

-0.259 ***
(0.099)

-4.543 **
(2.131)

White, non-Hispanic percent of the youth population

0.011
(0.035)

-0.019
(0.037)

1.190 *
(0.640)

Student demand variables

Other control variables
Enrollment (1000s) L

-0.223 ***
(0.027)

-0.203 ***
(0.026)

0.043
(0.027)

2.585 **
(1.050)

Enrollment^2 (1000s) L

0.002 ***
(0.0003)

0.002 ***
(0.0003)

-0.0003
(0.0004)

-0.039 *
(0.022)

Median state income ($1000s) L

-0.013
(0.060)

0.019
(0.055)

-0.069 *
(0.036)

-0.607
(0.726)

Median state income ^2 ($1000s) L

0.0002
(0.0005)

-0.0001
(0.0005)

0.0007 **
(0.0003)

0.003
(0.006)

R- squared (overall)

0.149

0.4717

0.6296

0.5140

Significance levels: * > 90%, ** > 95%, *** > 99%
State and year fixed effects and a constant term were included in the estimation, but the coefficients are omitted for brevity.
Total number of observations: 7,103 from 479 schools over 15 years (2001-2015), unbalanced panel, L indicates one year lag.

The results suggest that the rising proportional tuition burden is not simply the result of
higher education losing funding due to competition from other state funded programs. State and
university characteristics appear to affect tuition revenues, indicating that demand is a significant
determinant of the tuition proportion. The evidence showing that demographics and political
institutions contribute to varying dependence on tuition revenue indicates a nuanced legislative
process of funding allocation where political priorities and social beliefs affect the distribution of
the funding burden.
State unemployment is negatively correlated with state funding and positively correlated
with tuition revenue at universities within the state; however, the regression results did not produce
a statistically significant relationship with tuition revenue measured as a proportion of government
funding. The correlation with dollar amounts of revenue are consistent with the literature and
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support the intuitive theory that higher education funding is at least partially determined by
exogenous economic conditions and state budget pressures. There is little doubt that budget
shortfalls contribute to lower levels of subsidization for higher education. However, the other
results from the model also show that different institutional environments and funding priorities
between the states, and changes to these factors over time, also have significant effects on the
funding of higher education.
The unemployment rate captures the effects of unanticipated changes to funding
competition between public programs. Spending on primary and secondary education is a large
component of state budgets. But unlike state spending related to economic fluctuations, K-12
spending is relatively stable and foreseeable. K-12 funding is correlated negatively with the
proportional student funding burden, indicating that changes to K-12 funding do not crowd out
higher education funding. In other words, states that spend more on K-12 education also subsidize
higher education at a higher rate despite the fact that these budget items are in direct competition
for available state funding. This supports the theory that beliefs about the value of education and
the desire to subsidize it may be more important in determining higher education funding than
budgetary competition from known and anticipated state programs.
The poverty rate is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with the state
funding. However, the poverty rate does not have a statistically significant effect on tuition
revenue per student or tuition as a proportion of government funding. This offers additional
evidence to explain inelastic substitution between state funding and tuition.
Higher levels of post-secondary education attendance among the population are correlated
with higher levels of state funding, lower tuition revenue, and lower proportional tuition revenue
despite the associated budgetary challenges. States seem to be altering their budgets to fund higher
education rather than funding it in accordance with existing budget constraints. Politicians and
university governing boards may increase state appropriations and decrease tuition as a response
to the political pressure created by a larger constituent group with a personal interest in lowering
the tuition burden.
In contrast with Koshal and Koshal’s (2000) and Rizzo’s (2006) findings, Democratic party
control of the state legislature was not correlated with a lower tuition. This contrasting result is
likely due to recent changes in both tuition policies and state legislative control. If data from 20132015 is omitted, the estimated effect of Democratic Party control is similar to the prior findings
showing lower tuition burden in states and years with Democratic majorities.
Schools with independent governing boards do not appear to receive their revenues from a
significantly different proportional mix of sources. This result contrasts with prior research
suggesting that schools with independent governing boards may be crowded out of budget
allocations when competing against multi-campus governing boards (Lowry 2001b). Also, it does
not support the hypothesis or prior research (Kim and Ko 2015) that increased administrative
autonomy leads universities to raise more revenue through tuition. However, another related result
from this analysis corroborates with the prior research. The number of university boards of
governors in the state is negatively correlated with state appropriations per student allocated to
universities and is positively correlated with the proportional tuition revenue. Universities in states
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with many boards of governors may have more difficulty lobbying for state appropriations. This
result again suggests state funding for universities is the result of a more complex negotiation
process than a simple budget item subject to available revenue.
When estimated at mean values of all variables, an additional $1000 in federal revenue per
student is estimated to reduce average tuition by approximately $356. This is similar to previous
findings in the literature that show federal grant-aid is relatively inefficient at lowering average
tuition. When federal grant-aid is increased, not all students receive the aid. If universities raise
tuition rates to capture the increased grant-aid, then the students who do not qualify for the aid will
pay more out-of-pocket tuition while the students receiving the aid will see their out-of-pocket
expense remain relatively constant. The idea that universities will raise tuition rates in response
to increases in grant-aid was first suggested by Secretary of Education William J. Bennett (1987)
and is referred to as the Bennett Hypothesis. Several previous studies have found mixed evidence
of the Bennet Hypothesis. Singell and Stone (2007) found little evidence from public universities
to support the theory, while other studies suggested the relationship does exist (M. Rizzo and
Ehrenberg 2004; Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg 2013). The positive correlation between
federal funding and the dollar amounts of tuition revenue per student found in this study supports
the Bennet Hypothesis. However, the evidence also shows that increasing federal funding
correlates with increased state appropriations as well. These simultaneous effects lead to the
negative coefficient for federal funding’s effect on tuition measured as a proportion of government
revenue.
The model indicates that schools that are less selective in their admissions receive a
significantly lower dollar amount of tuition revenue per student than universities with more
restrictive admissions policies. The ability of schools to be selective in their admissions indicates
a high level of student demand. The observation that schools with restrictive admissions are
capturing student demand through their tuition payments supports the theory that public higher
education revenues are not merely determined by state allocations. Universities appear to be
actively considering student demand in the pricing of their services, which as outlined in the
conceptual framework for this analysis, reinforces the shift toward increasing reliance on tuition
as a source of university revenue. As discussed earlier, open-admission policies are usually a
component of state policy intended to increase the accessibility of higher education. However,
schools with open admissions did not receive a statistically significant difference in the amount of
state appropriations. Schools with open admissions also did not generate a statistically significant
effect on the proportional measurement of tuition revenue.
An unsurprising result is the positive and statistically significant relationship between the
percentage of out-of-state students and tuition revenue. Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004) also found
evidence that out-of-state students contribute to increases in tuition revenues, and Jaquette and
Curs (2015) suggest universities may actively pursue out-of-state students as a revenue generating
strategy. A higher percentage of out-of-state students is an indicator of high student demand for
the university, and this result offers support for the argument that student demand is a critical factor
in determining the sources of university revenues. It also suggests that universities are actively
considering student demand in their pricing and revenue generating strategies.
Compared to other schools, top-tier research schools take in higher dollar amounts of
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revenue by charging higher tuition, but also receive much higher levels of state funding. Student
demand for high-ranking schools may explain the ability of these schools to generate more tuition
revenue, again giving evidence that student demand is a critical determinant of higher education
funding. Since higher Carnegie rankings are associated with research focused universities, the
higher state appropriations to these schools may indicate a desire to receive a return from funding
to higher education rather than simply subsidizing student costs.
Tuition as a proportion of government funding is higher at public universities when and
where there is a larger private college market presence. The estimations of the per-student dollar
amounts indicates that public universities may be strategically altering their tuition rates with
respect to the relative market share of private schools. Additionally, states allocate fewer dollars
per student in states with a higher percentage of private school attendance. These results support
the narrative that a higher market share of private schools contributes to the shift toward a tuition
driven system of funding. That this relationship is observed while accounting for both state and
year fixed effects shows that the commodifying effect of private competition varies not only over
time, but also across the different higher education markets of the states.
A higher youth percentage of the population correlates with higher state appropriations,
lower tuition revenue, and lower tuition as a proportion of government funding, which supports
the theory that constituent priorities affect how states spend. This result is partially mitigated by
the estimated effects of racial demographics within the youth population. White, non-Hispanic
youth tend to attend four-year colleges at relatively higher rates (National Center for Education
Statistics 2019a), so a higher percentage of this demographic is likely correlated with higher
demand. Universities appear to be capturing this demand effect, which increases tuition as a
proportion of government funding.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the regressions give evidence to support a model of higher education funding
where the institutional environment guiding public policy and student demand effect the relative
funding burden between public and private revenue sources. This analysis describes higher
education funding not as a simple annual budgetary issue, but as a dilemma where complex
institutional factors contribute to the distribution of the funding burden. Despite the general trend,
the reliance on privately paid tuition as a revenue source for public universities is not universal or
unavoidable. The evidence from this study shows that states and universities can effectively aid or
resist the shift toward an increased reliance on tuition revenue. Shifting higher education funding
toward tuition revenue can reduce state spending and the tax burden. On the other hand, resisting
the shift toward tuition as a source of funding may have significant policy implications in addition
to reducing the financial burden placed on students. Declining public funding and an increased
reliance on tuition revenue may also increase stratification between types of universities (Hoxby
2009). The evidence of the importance of demand in this analysis and prior research (Hemelt and
Marcotte 2011) show that not all universities have the same ability to raise revenue through
increased tuition rates. If all schools shift toward a tuition-based funding structure, those that are
less successful in generating tuition revenue may experience declining total revenues leading to
lower quality education.
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Policy makers should also note that the institutional shifts leading to a rising tuition burden
are not solely the result of government policies or an anti-student bias. Students and student
advocates have consistently called for curricula shifts toward career-oriented education, and the
increased emphasis on the financial benefits of higher education has increased the demand for
higher education (Loss 2012; Thelin 2011). As shown in the empirical results here, universities
are willing and able to capture student demand in the form of higher tuition revenue. The demandside pressure on tuition rates has also been noted by others (Brown 2000; Kerr 2001; Newfield
2008). Therefore, policies focused on alleviating the tuition burden for students at public
universities should not ignore the effects of student demand and the ability of public universities
to capture that demand.
This research provides evidence that identifiable institutional differences affect state
appropriations, tuition revenue, and the proportional tuition burden. The empirical results also
show that universities are effectively capturing student demand in order to generate higher tuition
revenues. These results show that the typical practice of modeling higher education funding as a
series of annual, exogenous, budgetary decisions neglects the complexity of the institutional
environment surrounding higher education funding policies.
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